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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND NEPOTISM
A 1942 Louisiana statute limited navigation of "sea-
going vessels" in the port of New Orleans to state licensed
pilots.1 Plaintiffs, federally licensed pilots with at least fif-
teen years experience in the port and elsewhere, thus could
navigate only coastwise vessels.2  They applied to the State
Board of River Port Commissioners for appointment as state
licensed pilots., The Board refused to examine plaintiffs,
since they had not completed a six-months apprenticeship re-
quired by statute.4  The practice persists of permitting state
licensed pilots to select apprentices, and with few exceptions
only friends and relatives are given the opportunity for train-
ing.5 Effectually barred from obtaining a license, plaintiffs
sought relief in the state court, contending they had been
denied equal protection of the laws. The Louisiana Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint.,
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the statutes
to be related to the objective of the entire pilotage law-to
secure for the state "the safest and most efficiently operated
pilotage system practicable." Kotch v. Board of River Port
Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (Rutledge, Reed, Doug-
las, and Murphy, JJ. dissenting.)
This decision sanctions a state regulated system of pi-
1. La. Gen. Stat. (Supp., 1946) §§9155, 9156.
2. Regulation of "seagoing shipping" is within the control of the
state governments. Congress under the commerce clause (U.S.
Const. Art. I, §8) has supreme power to regulate pilotage, but by
adoption of Rev. Stat. §4235 (1878), 46 U.S.C. §211 (1940), ex-
pressed an intention not to deprive the states of power to regu-
late pilots. Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187(1912). Regulation of coastwise shipping, however, is now ex-
clusively under federal control. Rev. Stat. §§4401, 4444 (1875),
46 U.S.C. H§ 215, 364 (1940).
3. La. Gen. Stat. (Dart, 1939) §9154.
4. La. Gen. Stat (Dart, 1939) §9157.
5. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 555(1947). Selection of apprentices is accomplished by electing pros-
pective apprentices into a pilot's association formed under author-
ity of State law. La. Gen. Stat. (Dart, 1939) §9159. The state
supreme court in its decision in the instant case construed the
Act to require apprenticeship under present state pilot officers.
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 209 La. 737, 25
So.2d 527 (1946).
6. 209 La. 737, 25 So.2d 527 (1946).
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lotage which limits selection of pilots on the basis of nepotism.
To establish their charge of an unconstitutional discrimina-
tion, plaintiffs relied heavily on the case of Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins.7 In that case a San Francisco ordinance made it un-
lawful to conduct a laundry business in other than brick
buildings without having first obtained the permission of a
board of supervisors. All Chinese laundries were conducted
in wooden buildings. The supervisors permitted the opera-
tion of all laundries in wooden buildings except those owned
by Chinese. Thus, Yick Wo and other Chinese were system-
atically denied permission to engage in their calling. The
Supreme Court held that equal protection of the laws had
been denied.8 In the principal case the majority astutely
distinguished the Yick Wo decision by observing that the
discrimination forbidden was purely racial in character and
thus did not govern the case under consideration. 9 Justice
Rutledge, in his dissent,0 admits the discrimination shown
was not consciously racial in character, but contends that
the Kotch case falls squarely within the ruling of the Yick
Wo decision because racial discrimination cannot be distin-
guished from nepotism.
The issue presented by the two opinions is whether a
regulation based on nepotism is to be tested by the strict
rule forbidding racial discrimination" or is to be evaluated
by the more elastic rule of reasonableness applied to economic
regulation.- The majority in choosing the latter was in-
fluenced by two important considerations.
7. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
8. "The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is
shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for
.it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the
petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is not justified.
The discrimination is, therefore, illegal, and the public adminis-
tration which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of
the laws and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution." 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
9. 'Yick Wo was denied the right to engage in an occupation
solely because he was Chinese." 330 U.S. 552, 557 (1947).
10. 330 U.S. 552, 564 (1947).
11. See n.16, 17 infra.
12. "There is therefore no precise application of the rule of reason-
ableness of classification, and the rule of equality permits many
practical irregularities." Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Say. Bank,
170 U.S. 283, 296 (1898). The equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power
to classify in the adoption of police laws but admits of a wide
scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only
19481
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
First, there was no racial discrimination shown. Al-
though nepotism and racial discrimination are similar, it is
submitted that they are distinguishable for the purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Amendment became a part
of the Constitution to guarantee the rights of the emancipated
race for which the Civil War had been fought. The Court
early gave judicial recognition to that fact and speaking of
the equal protection clause stated: "We doubt very much
whether any action of a state not directed by way of discrim-
ination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this
provision." 3 Later cases recognized that the protection must
necessarily be extended to all races. 4 Similarly discrimina-
tions against persons for reasons other than race were held
to be within the Constitutional prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 But when a racial discrimination is presented,
the Court feels mandated by the people to strike down all
barriers erected by a state because of color.1 6 The attitude
with which race legislation is viewed has amounted in effect
to a presumption of the legislation's unconstitutionality.1?
if it is without any reasonable basis and is therefore purely ar-
bitrary, Chicago R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 (1911); Louisville
R.R. v. Melton, 218 U.S. 86 (1910).
13. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873).
14. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Maxwell v. Dow, 176
U.S. 581 (1900); Yiek Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
15. In Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886);
Waite, C.J., said: "The court does not wish to hear argument on
the question whether the provision in the fourteenth amendment
to the Constitution which forbids a state to deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to
these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does."
16. "The 14th Amendment, adopted as it was with special solicitude
for the equal protection of members of the Negro race lays a
duty upon the court to level by its judgment these barriers of
color." Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 81, 89 (1932): "States may do a
good deal of classifying that it is difficult to believe rational, but
there are liits, and it is too clear for extended argument that
color cannot be made the basis of statutory classification affecting
the right set up in this case." Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 540,
541 (1927).
17. See n.16, supra. In Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 32, 41 (1915), Mr.
Justice Hughes said: "It is sought to justify this act as an
exercise of the power of the state to make reasonable classifica-
tions in legislating to promote the health, safety, morals, and
welfare of those within its jurisdiction. But this admitted au-
thority, with the broad range of legislative discretion that it im-
plies, does not go so far as to make it possible for the state to
deny to lawful inhabitants, because of their race or nationality,
the ordinary means of earning a livelihood." See Korematsu v.
[Vol 23
NOTES
On the other hand, in cases involving state regulation of
economic affairs a greater latitude is accorded to legislative
judgment-in fact, the policy pursued amounts to one of
judicial self-restraint, resulting in a presumption of consti-
tutionality.18 The reason for the differentiation in the two
classes of cases is that in the economic regulation field the
Court does not feel it is under compulsion to narrowly limit
the bounds of state action. That reason would appear to
apply with equal vigor to any legislation not involving a
racial discrimination. Therefore, the correct test to be ap-
plied in the principal case is that used when examining any
other state regulatory legislation.
Secondly, the case tests the right and power of a state
to select its own officers.19 The relation of the means of
regulation to the end sought by the statute-that of securing
a safe and efficient pilotage system-is controversial. Ques-
tions of degree are inescapable,20 and if reasonable men may
U.S., 323 U.S., 214, 216 (1944) (dicta to the effect that race re-
strictions are subjected to rigid scrutiny).
18. U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
19. The Court accepted the Louisiana court's construction that the
pilots were state officers. The state decision is not binding upon
the Supreme Court when a right guaranteed by the federal Con-
stitution is concerned. Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 441 (1931).
The Court speaking through Mr. Justice Stone said, "An office is a
public station conferred by the appointment of government. The
term embraces the idea of tenure, duration, emolument and duties
fixed by law." There must be an office before there can be an
officer. Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 520 (1925). The
Louisiana Statutes create the office of "River Port Pilots." La.
Gen. Stat. (Dart, 1939) §9155. The number of pilots and their
duties are specified. La. Gen. Stat. (Dart, 1939) §§9155, 9156,
9157. The pilots must take an oath of office and furnish bond.
Id. at §9160. A procedure is set up to try incompetent pilots.
Id. at §9161. Deference should be granted to state judicial con-
struction of long standing_. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Phil-
lips, 67 Sup. Ct. 1584, 1585 (1947). Louisiana early decided that
pilots were state officers. Levine v. Michel, 35 La. Ann. Rep.
1121, 1124 (1883); Louisiana v. Follett, 33 La. Ann. Rep. 228,
230 (1881); Williams v. Payson, 14 La. Ann. Rep. 7, 8 (1859).
The Louisiana Pilots have many, if not all, of the characteristics
of state officers. Therefore, it seems that the state's determina-
tion should be respected.
20. "Thus we come to the usual question of degree and of drawing a
line where no important distiction can be seen between the nearest
points on the two sides, but where the distinction between the
extreme is plain." Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 23(1930).
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differ,'21 governmental regulation ought to be sustained.22
Furthermore, the Court is reluctant to interfere with the
standards or qualifications adopted by the state when select-
ing its officers.23 This consideration becomes important in
permitting wider discretion to legislative judgment when
testing the rational basis of the legislation under attack.
Absent the state officer element, it is possible the Court
would have declared the discrimination unreasonable and
arbitrary.24
It might be argued that the right to work, i.e., equal op-
portunity for all to pursue his chosen profession, is a civil
liberty. While one may have a constitutional right to pursue
his chosen calling, he does not have a constitutional right
to do so free from reasonable professional standards imposed
by state regulation. For where there is a rational basis for
legislative judgment25 and the means of regulation is related
to the end sought,26 state legislation regulating professions
and callings has been consistently upheld.27
21. In fields other than those involving civil liberties, Justice Holmes
refused to strike down legislation on the reasons or policy of
which reasonable men differ. Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161, 191(1907) (dissenting opinion); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 76 (1905) (dissenting opinion). This view has been acceptedby the Court, Nebbia v. NRew York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-39 (1933).
22. "The interpretation of constitutional principles must not be tooliteral. We must remember that the machinery of government
would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints."
Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931).
23. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1943); Taylor v. Beckham, 178
U.S. 548 (1900).
24. It must be noted that the majority takes into account that the
case is unique and carefully limits the decision to pilotage. 330
U.S. 552, 564 (1947).
25. Discrimination will be upheld if it "does not preclude the possi-
bility of a rational basis for the legislative judgment." Clarke
v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (denial of pool hall li-
censes to aliens upheld).
26. Chicago R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 529 (1911); Louisville R.R.
v. Melton, 218 U.S. 36 (1910). "A very wide licretion must be
conceded to the legislative power of the State in the classification
of trades, callings, businesses or occupations which may be sub-jected to special forms of regulation or taxation through an ex-
cise or license tax. If the selection or classification is neither
capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some reasonable consid-
eration of difference or policy, there is no denial of the equal
protection of the law." Brown-Fonman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S.
563, 573 (1910).
27. State regulation of pilotage has consistently been upheld. SeeAnderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187 (1912); Olson
v, Smith? 195 U.S. 344 (1904); Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U.S. 572
[Vol. 23
NOTEs
Furthermore, if the right to work were considered a
civil liberty, it might be urged that the nepotic system em-
ployed by Louisiana in selecting officers was not an uncon-
stitutional infringement of that liberty. In United Public
Workers of America v. Mitchel,28 the Hatch Act was sustained
against a charge that it unconstitutionally violated the right
to free speech and to engage in political activity.2 , The ma-
jority there indicated that the requisite protection of civil
rights did not restrict the reasonable regulation permitted
to Congress in legislation promulgated to regulate govern-
ment employees. Indeed, it held that the "clear and present
danger doctrine, 3° applied to legislation restricting citizens'
civil liberties, was not applicable to the regulation of govern-
ment employees. Thus, it can be contended that the prohibi-
tion of discriminatory legislation in the field of private call-
ings is not applicable when a state is selecting pilot officers in
the reasonable regulation of commerce.
(1880). Cf. Semler v. Oregon, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (dentists);
Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337 (1929) (optometrists); Hayman
v. Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927) (osteopaths); Hurwitz v. North,
271 U.S. 40 (1926) (physicians); Lehman v. Board of Account-
ancy, 263 U.S. 394 (1923) (public accountants); Bratton v. Chan-
dler, 260 U.S. 110 (1922) (real estate brokers); La Tourette v.
McMasters, 248 U.S. 465 (1919) (insurance agents); Merchants
Exchange v. Missouri, 248 U.S. 365 (1919) (public weighers of
grain) ; Crane v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 339 (1917) (healers by mental
suggestion); Lehan v. Atlanta, 242 U.S. 53 (1916) (private de-
tectives); Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340 (1916) (employment
agencies); Gundlimg v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 (1900) (cigarette
vendors).
28. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
29. 53 Stat. 1147 (1939), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. §611 (Supp. 1946).
The Act restricts substantially all employees in the executive
branch of the federal government making it unlawful "to take
any active part in political management or in political campaigns."
30. In the case of state restrictions upon the basic guaranties of civil
liberties in the First Amendment there is a presumption against
the validity of the law, and the burden of proof rests upon those
who defend it to show that the invasion of civil liberty is justi-
fied by some "clear and present danger" to the public security.
West Virginia Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938) (restrictions on religion held unconstitutional);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1944); Thornhill v. Ala. 310
U.S. 88 (1940) (restrictions on freedom of speech prohibited).
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